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Prytania Park Hotel Limited v. General Star Indemnity
Company: A Misapplication of Civil Code Article 466
I. INTRODUCTION
In Louisiana, property is broken down into movables and immovables.1
According to the Louisiana Civil Code, there are several ways that a movable thing
can become an immovable thing.' One such way is for that movable to be
classified as a component part of an immovable; that movable then takes the status
of an immovable.3 Article 466 of the Civil Code defines when a movable is a
component part of an immovable:4
Things permanently attached to a building or other construction, such
as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other installations, are its
component parts.
Things are considered permanently attached if they cannot be
removed without substantial damage to themselves or to the immovable
to which they are attached.'
The article, as written, seems to define component parts in the first paragraph.
In order to satisfy the requirement of "permanent attachment" in the first paragraph,
the movable would have to pass the test outlined in the second paragraph. Read
literally, the second paragraph of Article 466 requires that in order for a movable
to be considered permanently attached, removal would have to cause substantial
damage to either the movable or the immovable to which it is attached.' However,
if a literal interpretation were proper, hypothetically, what classification would the
doors to a home receive?7 Would they be considered component parts, or would
they retain their movable status, surprising every eager purchaser of a home who
cannot secure his belongings because he has no door? Giving Article 466 a literal
interpretation, the doors could only be considered component parts if the removal
of the doors would cause substantial damage to either the doors or the house.,
Under this civilian interpretation, the doors would certainly be considered
movables and not component parts since,no damage would result from removing
Copyright 2000. by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. La. Civ. Code art. 448.
2. La. Civ. Code arts. 465-67.
3. La. Civ. Code art. 469 provides, "the transfer or encumbrance of an immovable includes its
component parts."
4. La. Civ. Code art. 466.
5. Id.
6. Id., para. 2.
7. Article 466 would be irrelevant concerning the doors in case of a sale since the Civil Code
includes accessories to an immovable with the immovable itself in that scenario. See La. Civ. Code art.
2461. However, in the mortgagee/mortgagor or successorship scenario, them is no such accessory
article.
8. La. Civ. Code art. 466.
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doors from hinges. As a result of this conclusion, courts have historically strayed
from this strict and literal interpretation.'
Also, it might not be possible for the doors to attain component part status
given a strict interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 466. That first
paragraph provides, "Things permanently attached... such as plumbing, heating,
cooling, electrical or other installations, are.., component parts."'" Thus, using
a strict interpretation, in order to be considered a component part, the movable must
first fit within the list of movables in the first paragraph. The use of the words
.'such as"-indicates that the list is illustrative. Because doors are not listed, they
would have to fit in the category of "other installations." Evoking ejusdem generis,
a civilian interpretation method, "other installations" would refer to movables that
are in the same class or genre as the listed movables." Since doors have nothing
in common with plumbing, air conditioning, etc., they would not fit the definition
of component parts. As a result of this conclusion, the courts have also rejected the
ejusdem generis interpretation of the list of movables in the first paragraph of
Article 466. '2 Instead, these courts have adopted a test based on contemporary
objective standards concerning components of a modern-day building to determine
what should or should not be included within the first paragraph of Article 466.13
To apply this test, the court inquires as to whether an ordinary, reasonable person
would expect the movable to pass with the immovable in an act of sale."
This article will analyze the court's literal interpretation of Article 466 in
Prytania Park Hotel Limited v. General Star Indemnity Company. Part H will
discuss the facts and holding of the case itself. Part III will discuss the prior
statutory law and prior interpretation of Article 466. Part IV will discuss the
substantive problems with the interpretation of Article 466. Also, Part V will show
the procedural problems with the court's interpretation of Article 466.
II. THE CASB
A. Facts
The Prytania Park Hotel caught on fire, causing extensive damage to one of its
buildings including its contents and attached fixtures.'" The hotel was insured on
a policy issued by the defendant, GeneralStar Indemnity (hereafter referred to as
9. See Coulterv. Texaco, i 17F.3d 909(5th Cir. 1997); United States Environmental Protection
Agency v. New Orleans Public Service. Inc.. 826 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1987); Equibank v. U. S. Internal
Revenue Service, 749 F.2d 1176 (5th Cr. 1985); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Shel-Boze, Inc., 527
So. 2d 1052 (La. 1988); Hyman v. Ross. 643 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
10. See La. Civ. Code art. 466.
II. Ejusdem generis can be evoked when an illustrative list of things is articulated. It guides the
expansion of the list and limits the list to things that are in the same genre or class as the things listed.
12. See cases cited supra note 9.
13. Id. See also Lafleur v. Foret. 213 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) (an application of this
test to Article 467: Immovables by nature (subsequently repealed)).
14. See supra note 9.
15. Prytania Park Hotel v. General Star Indemnity Co., 179 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1999).
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"General"). The policy covered (1) loss or damage to the building including
permanently installed fixtures, machinery at replacement value, and (2) loss or
damage to furniture compensable at actual cash value.' 6 In hopes of getting full
replacement value, the owners of the hotel submitted a building claim including
fixtures attached to the walls of the hotel. General paid only part of the building
claim, refusing to pay for the fixtures 7 on the wall at replacement value."1 The
owners filed a breach of contract action seeking to recover the portions of their
claims that were unpaid. The court held that the fixtures in question fell outside of
the realm of the insurance contract. However, the court went on to analyze the
facts as if the contract did not exist. It stated that in order for the fixtures in
question to be considered "permanent fixtures," they must be component parts
"within the confines of [AIrticle 466."' 9
B. Holding, Dicta, Rationale, and Ramifications
The court held that the fixtures were not covered in the language of the
insurance policy. However, in dicta, the court stated that the fixtures in this case
were not component parts under Article 466.11 Specifically, the court gave Article
466 a strict interpretation as discussed previously. As a result, this case establishes
only one type of component part. The first paragraph of Article 466, the court
ruled, is an illustrative list of the kind of movable things susceptible of being
classified as a component part."' In analyzing this list, the court ruled that it should
not be analyzed by looking to the expectations of society, but should be extended
only using the civilian concept of ejusdem generis. " As a result, the court held that
the fixtures in question were not susceptible of ever being component parts since
they did not have enough in common with the list expounded in the first paragraph
of Article 466.
The court interpreted the second paragraph of Article 466 as the actual test as
to whether a movable satisfies the definition of permanent attachment as required
in the first paragraph. The fixtures, the court asserted for arguments sake, would
not have passed the test of paragraph two of the article, assuming that the fixtures
were even susceptible of component part status. The court reasoned, "A
straightforward reading of Article 466 requires that the permanence of any
movable's installation in 'a building or other construction' meet the definition of
'permanently attached' in the article's second paragraph."23
16. Id.
17. The actual fixtures in this case are irrelevant for the purposes of this casenote. The court may
have arrived at the proper conclusion in this case, however, it is the reasoning and interpretation of
Article 466 that is flawed and the focus of this note.
18. Prylania, 179 F. 3d at 173.
19. Id. at 178.
20. This case could have been and in fact was decided without analyzing Article 466.
21. Prytania, 179 F. 3d at 179.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
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The holding of the court here limits the application of Article 466. In order for
a movable to ever become a component part, it must be "sufficiently similar to the
four identified by name in Article 466's illustrative list." ' Once that movable
satisfies the first paragraph of Article 466, then it must satisfy the test set up in
paragraph two of the article to become a component part.' As will be seen below,
this interpretation represents a break from the interpretations of previous courts.
Before an analysis of this holding and interpretation, it would be helpful to look at
the statutory law in existence prior to the enactment of Article 466 as well as the
jurisprudence concerning component parts that has evolved since the enactment.
I. PRIOR LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
A. Prior Statutory Law
Prior to the enactment of Article 466 in 1978, Civil Code articles 46726 and
46927 governed movables becoming immovables as component parts. These
articles set up two separate and distinct ways that a movable would become an
immovable as a component part.2" The first of these ways was if the movable fell
within the text of Article 467, Immovable by Nature. Article 467 read as follows:
Wire screens, water pipes, gas pipes, sewerage pipes, heating pipes,
radiators, electric wires, electric and gas lighting fixtures, bathtubs,
lavatories, closets, sinks, gasplants, meters and electric light plants,
heating plants and furnaces, when actually connected with or attached to
the building by the owner for the use or convenience of the building are
immovable by nature.29
The list in Article 467 was illustrative and was applied by the courts analogously."
Thus, under this article, when any movable, either found in the list or analogous to
a movable in the list, was attached to a building by the owner for the use or
convenience of the building, that movable became an immovable by nature.
3 1
A second way that a movable would become a component part and thus become an
immovable is if it fell within the purview of Article 469.2 This article provided:
24. Id. The court is citing a sliver of text from a law review article written by Professor Symeon
Symeonides, Developments in Business Law, 1984-1985, Property, 46 La. L Rev. 655 (1986).
25. Prytanla, 179 F. 3d at 179. The test requires that the removal of the movable would cause
substantial damage to either the movable or the immovable to which it is attached.
26. La. Civ. Code art. 467 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts No. 728)
27. La. Civ. Code art. 469 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts No. 728).
28. M. Charles Wallfisch. Property--Permanent Attachment-The Chandeliers Case, 61 Tul.
L Rev. 440,441 (1986).
29. La. Civ. Code art. 467 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts No. 728).
30. See Holicer Gas Co. v. Wilson, 45 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950); Scott v. Brennan. 161
La. 1017, 109 So. 822 (La. 1926); the analogous interpretation included things such as air conditioners
and water heaten.
31. Wallfisch, supra note 28, at 442.
32. Id.
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The owner is supposed to have attached to his tenement or building
forever such movables as are affixed to the same with plaster, or mortar,
or such as cannot be taken off without being broken or injured, or without
breaking or injuring the part of the building to which they are attached."
A careful reading of Article 469 shows that it differed from Article 467 as far as
attachment was concerned. Article 467 did not make mention of the permanence
of the attachment of the movable to the building. However, Article 469 does seems
to contemplate a "much closer degree of attachment to, or incorporation into" the
immovable.3'
In 1978, the legislature decided to enact current Article 466, thus eliminating
the need for Articles 467 and 469. This enactment was intended to simplify the law
concerning component parts" and also abolish the category of immovables by
destination. 6
B. Jurisprudential Interpretation of Current Article 466
1. Federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
The leading case37 interpreting current Civil Code article 466 is Equibank v.
U.S. Internal Revenue Service.3 In Equibank, the court held that chandeliers
attached to the ceiling of a home were component parts within the meaning of
Article 466.19 In that case, chandeliers had been wired to the home which was
mortgaged in favor of the bank. When the owners of the home failed to pay federal
taxes, the IRS took possession of the residence, including the chandeliers.' The
court found that the two paragraphs of Article 466 are to be read independently of
33. La. Civ. Code art. 469 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts, No. 728).
34. Symeonides. supra note 24, at 655.
35. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Work of the Legialature-Properry, 39 La. L Rev. 166 (1978).
36. La. Civ. Code art. 468 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts No. 728) provided:
Things which the owner of a tract of land has placed upon it for its service and improvement
are immovable by destination. Thus the following things are immovable by destination
when they have been placed by the owner for the service and improvement of a tract of land.
to wit: Cattle intended for cultivation. Implements of husbandry. Seeds, plants, fodder, and
manure. Pigeons in a pigeon house. Beehives. Mills, kettles, alemibcs, vats, and other
machinery made use of in carrying on the plantation works. The utensils necessary for
working cotton, and sawmills. taffia distilleries, sugar refineries and other manufactures.
All such movables as the owner has attached pernmently to the tenement or to the building,
are likewise immovable by destination.
37. The reason that this case is considered the leading case is probably because two of the three
judges deciding the case, namely Rubin and Politz, are arguably two of the best judges Louisiana has
produced.
38. 749 F.2d 1176(5th Cir. 1985).
39. Id.
40. Equibank had a mortgage over the residence while the IRS had secured a lien on the contents.
Thus, if the chandeliers were considered component parts, they would belong to the bank. However,
if the chandeliers are not considered component parts, they would be covered by the IRS lien.
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each other."' In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on Professor
Yiannopoulos' testimony that the two paragraphs of Article 466 delineated two
separate and distinct categories of component parts.' 2 The court appointed
Yiannopoulos in order to assist in interpreting the language of the article. He
asserted that the first paragraph defines component parts as a matter of law,
meaning that removability is immaterial.' 3 The second paragraph defines
component parts as a matter of fact, meaning that a movable will only be
considered a component part if it meets the test of permanent attachment in the
second paragraph of Article 466." The court also adopted Professor
Yiannopoulos' position that movables fitting into the first paragraph of component
parts (as a matter of law) were to be determined based on "what ideas prevail in
society today with respect to an ordinary buyer of ordinary prudence."'4
Because Equibank was a Fifth Circuit federal decision, subsequent panels
of the Fifth Circuit are bound by that holding since "the Fifth Circuit is a strict stare
decisis court."' In U.S. Environmental Protection Agency v. New Orleans Public
Service, Inc.,47 decided two years after Equibank, the Fifth Circuit again held that
Article 466 should be interpreted treating each paragraph of Article 466
independently." Specifically, the court held that electrical transformers attached
to a brewery were component parts of the brewery.'9 The Fifth Circuit had another
chance to discuss Article 466 in Coulter v. Texaco.' In Coulter, the court again
applied the rationale and holding from Equibank.5'
2. Louisiana State Courts
In Louisiana, state courts are not bound by stare decisis. Therefore,
Louisiana's case law is properly regarded as "secondary information. 5 2 As a
result, in Louisiana, "the judge is guided much more by doctrine, as expounded in
legal treatises by legal scholars, than the decisions of colleagues."5 3 However, even
though the Louisiana state courts are not bound by stare decisis, and even though
state courts are not bound by federal interpretations of state law, Louisiana courts
41. Equibank 749 F.2d at 1178.
42. Id. Professor Yiannopoulos points out that the second paragraph of IA. Civ. Code art. 466
covers items other than those fisted in the first paragraph.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1179.
46. FDIC v. Abraham, 137 F.3d 264. 268 (5th Cir. 1998).
47. 826 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1987).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 369.
50. 117 F.3d 909 (5th Cir. 1997).
51. Id. It is interesting to note that Judge Weiner wrote the opinion in Coulter advocating the
holding and test set up in Equibank. Two years later in the case at hand in this article. Judge Weiner
completely abandoned not only Equibank. but also his own decision two years earlier.
52. Moll v. Brown & Root. Inc., 1999 WL 155948 (E.D. La. Jan. 22. 1999).
53. Ui
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have nonetheless applied the rationale and interpretation of Article 466 as
expounded in Equibank.
The first circuit addressed the interpretation of Article 466 in American Bank
& Trust Co. v. Shel-Boze, Inc.' In that case, the court held that electrical
paraphernalia and carpeting are considered component parts as a matter of law
under the Equibank holding." By ruling that the carpeting and electrical
paraphernalia were component parts as a matter of law (fit within the first
paragraph of Article 466), the court basically held that an ordinary prudent person
purchasing a home would expect that the home come with the carpeting and the
fixtures. Thus, the first circuit is not only an advocate of the interpretation of
Article 466 as creating two independent types of component parts but also an
advocate of the "societal expectations" test.
The second circuit also interpreted Article 466 in Hyman v. Ross,56 fully
adopting the Equibank court's interpretation of Article 466." Specifically, the
court held that air conditioning and heating units were component parts as a matter
of law since heating and air conditioning are specifically listed in the first
paragraph of Article 466.1' The third circuit also adopted the Equibank
interpretation in Lakeside National Bank of Lake Charles v. Moreaux." In that
case, the court held that a septic tank and underground air conditioning lines were
component parts based on societal expectations.' Similarly, the fourth circuit
interpreted Article 466 in In re Chase Manhattan Leasing Corp.6 In Chase, a new
scoreboard was added to the Louisiana Superdome. Since the Superdome is state
owned, the scoreboard would be exempt from ad valorem taxes if it became part
of the Superdome as a component part. The court held that the scoreboard was in
fact a component part of the Superdome exempt from ad valorem taxes.62 The
court did not expressly adopt the holding in Equibank.' However, the court's
language suggests that the fourth circuit has also interpreted Article 466 as creating
two independent types of component parts. The court held, "a thing is a component
part if either of the paragraphs of Louisiana Civil Code article 466 are satisfied.""
Since the scoreboard was considered an electrical installation, it was a component
part in accord with the first paragraph of Article 466.6
As can be seen from this language, a movable becomes a component part of
an immovable in either of two ways: first, if it satisfies the first paragraph of
Article 466 (as a matter of law); or second, if it satisfies the test in the second
54. 527 So. 2d 1052 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1988).
55. Id.
56. 643 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 261.
59. 576 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
60. Id.
61. 626 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. id. at 434.
65. Id.
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paragraph of Article 466 (as a matter of fact). Seeing that both the federal Fifth
Circuit and Louisiana state courts have unanimously held that current Article 466
is comprised of two separate and independent types of component parts, one must
wonder why the court in Prytania decided to abandon these previous holdings. As
will be shown below, the decision expounded by the court is neither substantively
correct nor procedurally permissible.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS
A. The Prytania Court's Interpretation of Article 466 is Erroneous-The Case-
in-Chief
The court's main reasoning is that "the unambiguous wording of the revised
version of [Alrticle 466" mandates a "straightforward reading of [A]rticle 466."'
Accordingly, this straightforward reading "requires that the permanence of any
movable's installation in a building or other construction meet the definition of
permanently attached in the article's second paragraph."67
1. Internal Cognitive Dissonance
Civil Code article 9 provides, "When a law is clear and unambiguous and its
application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as
written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the
legislature." 8 In order for the court to have reached the conclusion that Article 466
must be given a straightforward interpretation, it must have made two assumptions.
The first assumption is that the wording of the article is unambiguous. The second
assumption is that the application of Article 466 (with a literal interpretation) does
not in fact lead to absurd consequences. The court in this case does not address
either one of these two prerequisites for giving Article 466 a literal interpretation.
What the court fails to address is that the application of Article 466, given a
straightforward interpretation, is both ambiguous and can lead to absurd
consequences.
The first paragraph of Article 466 provides, "Things permanently attached
to a building . . . such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other
installations, are its component parts." The use of the words "such as" modifies
the words "things permanently attached." Therefore, anything listed after the
words "such as" are necessarily "things permanently attached" and thus, are
component parts. However, the court in Prytania is forcing an interpretation that
requires that the things listed in the first paragraph also pass the test set up in the
second paragraph in order to become a component part.70 The fact that some courts
66. Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. General Star Indemnity Co., 179 F.3d 169,181 (5th Cir. 1999).
67. id. at 179.
68. La. Civ. Code art. 9.
69. La. Civ. Code art. 466, 1st para.
70. Prytania, 179 F. 3d at 179.
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have interpreted this language one way while this court interprets it another
demonstrates that the wording of Article 466 is far from being clear and
unambiguous.
This requirement that things listed in the first paragraph (already shown to be
"permanently attached") must also pass the test in the second paragraph to be
considered permanently attached also leads to absurd consequences. For instance,
what would the court say about a hot water heater? According to the court, the first
question to be asked is whether the thing falls withing the enumerated list in the
first paragraph of Article 466. The answer to this question is obviously yes, since
both plumbing and heating installations are covered. However, even though the
first paragraph is satisfied, the Prytania court requires that the hot water heater also
pass the second paragraph's test. In order for it to be considered a component part
of the immovable, removal of the heater would have to cause substantial damage
to either the immovable or the heater itselL7' In modem society, water heaters are
removed, interchanged and disposed of on a regular basis without causing any
damage to either the immovable to which it was attached or to the heater itself.
Therefore, according to the Prytania court's interpretation and rationale, a hot
water heater would not be considered a component part. 2 Proponents of the
court's interpretation may argue that this discussion is irrelevant since accessories
pass with the sale of an immovable and the water heater therefore would not be
removable." However, this is the case with a sale only. The result from the
previous example would still exist in the case of mortgages and successorships.
More disturbingly, under the court's rationale, movables that pass the test in
the second paragraph of Article 466 will not be considered component parts, even
though they fit the definition of permanently attached, if they do not fall within the
list in the first paragraph. 74 For instance, assume that a mortgage was taken out on
the owner's home. The owner had custom-made cabinets and shelving installed in
his home using both bolts and cement. Removal of the cabinets and shelving
would destroy the cabinets since the cement would break the back paneling off of
the cabinets and rip paint and plaster from the walls. If the bank were to foreclose,
could the homeowner remove the cabinets? How would the court treat the cabinets
and shelving?
The second paragraph provides that things are considered permanently
attached if removal would cause substantial damage to either the movable or to the
immovable to which it is attached." Here, the test is satisfied. Removal of the
71. See LaL Civ. Code art. 466, 2nd para.
72. The water heater example may not be dire. However, consider the same result with such
modem conveniences as toilets, doors, windows. etc.
73. La. Civ. Code art. 2460.
74. This is even more ofa problem since the court also held that the "societal expectations" test
should not be used to determine what types of things fit within the first paragraph. Instead. the court
narrowed the possible movables within the first paragraph list by asserting that the list is simply
illustrative. "Other installations" is to be determined using the civilian interpretation method of
ejusdem generis.
75. See La. Civ. Code art. 466,2nd para.
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cabinets would destroy them. Therefore, the cabinets are considered "permanently
attached." The first paragraph of Article 466 states that things permanently
attached to an immovable are its component parts. 6 Thus, it would seem that the
cabinets would be considered component parts. However, the Prytania court's
interpretation requires that the movable fit within the list expounded in the first
paragraph. In this instance, the cabinets would not fit within the list since they are
not in the same class as the listed movables. As a result, using the Prytania court's
interpretation of Article 466, the cabinets and shelving would not be considered
component parts of the home.
As can be seen from the previous two examples, the interpretation of Article
466 as presented by the Prytania court can lead to absurd consequences. It is
distressing that the court never discussed the implications of this interpretation
outside of this specific case. Article 9 of the Civil Code asserts that a literal
interpretation should be given when the application does not lead to absurd
consequences." In this case, the assumption that the application would not lead to
absurd consequences was incorrect. As a result, the literal interpretation that the
Prytania court gave Article 466 was also incorrect.
2. The History and Source of Article 466
The court in Prytania came to the conclusion that Article 466 creates only one
type of component part without giving any mention of the history and source of
Article 466. However, it seems as if the court made this conclusion based on the
notion that prior Article 467 (immovables by nature) was "suppressed." 78 If old
Article 467 was suppressed, then it would make perfect sense for the court to come
to the conclusion that the content of Article 467 is not embodied in the first
paragraph of Article 466. Whether or not old Article 467 was completely
suppressed is important because if it was not, then it would be embodied in the first
paragraph of Article 466 as a separate type of component part (an "immovable by
nature"). This result would necessarily show that Article 466 is composed of two
different types of component parts rather than just one.
The comments to current Article 466 do say that Article 467 has been
suppressed.79 However, immediately after this statement, the comment goes on to
say that "unity of ownership" and "use or convenience" are no longer required.'
This statement seems to assert that Article 467 was repealed only as to "unity of
ownership" and "use or convenience." The fact that nothing about the other
content of Article 467 is mentioned in the comments supports this proposition.
Legal doctrine tends to support this point as well. Professor Yiannopoulos, the
author of the aforementioned comments and official reporter on the revisions,
states, "Revised [A]rticle 466 creates a substantive change in the law by
76. See La. Civ. Code art. 466, 1st pam.
77. La. Civ. Code art. 9.
78. La. Civ. Code art. 466, cmt. (d).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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eliminating the 'use or convenience of the building' test for component parts as
well as the 'unity of ownership' requirement."" This seems to say that the only
substantive change in the law is that there is "no unity of ownership" or "use or
convenience" requirement. As a result, the remainder of prior Article 467 would
remain substantively correct and present in Article 466.
Professor Symeon Symeonides wrote similar support for this proposition. He
posits, "The first paragraph of current Article 466 can be traced to, and was
intended to replace, former Article 467."l He goes on to assert, "The substantive
change was to eliminate the requirement of 'unity of ownership,' that is, the
requirement that the attachment be made by the owner of the building.""
Symeonides also argues that the similarity between the first paragraph of current
Article 466 and prior Article 467 are just too close to be ignored." Article 466 lists
things such as "plumbing, heating, cooling, electric"" while prior Article 467 lists
things such as "water pipes ... heating pipes ... [and] electric and gas lighting
fixtures."" As can be seen, both lists contemplate plumbing, heating, and electric.
Thus, the change to the list from old Article 467 to current Article 466 can be and
should be explained as purely cosmetic and not a substantive change."
3. Statutory Indicators
Legal doctrine in Louisiana unanimously supports the proposition that Article
466 is actually made up of two separate and distinct types of component parts. In
addition, language in other statutes tends to support this argument. Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:5357 provides that when a mortgaged movable becomes a
component part of an immovable, the movable remains a movable as far as the
mortgage upon it is concerned and will not pass with the sale of the immovable "to
which it has been actually orfictitiously attached."" There is some question as to
what "actually or fictitiously" means. However, it does seem to convey that there
are two different types of attachment as opposed to just the one that the Prytania
court posits. Prior to the revisions in 1978,9:5357 required that the immovable be
attached as either an immovable by nature or by destination. 9 Immovables by
nature were such items "that were actually connected.., to the building."9 When
the revisions were made in 1978 and the classifications immovable by nature and
immovable by destination were omitted from the code, they were also omitted from
9:5357." However, when these classifications were omitted, the language
81. A. N. Yiannopoulos, Legislative Symposium-Property, 39 La. L Rev. 166 (1978).
82. See Symeonides, supra note 24, at 687.
83. Id. at 688.
84. Id.
'85. La. Civ. Code art. 466, 1st para.
86. La. Civ. Code art. 467 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts No. 728).
87. See Symeonides, supra note 24, at 688.
88. La. R.S. 9:5357 (1978) (emphasis added).
89. See Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Leger, 169 So. 170 (La. App. I st Cit. 1936).
90. See Wallfisch. supra note 28, at 441 (emphasis added).
91. See La. R.S. 9:5357 (1978).
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"actually or fictitiously attached" remained in the statute. The fact that those words
remained in the statute leads to the conclusion that even after the removal of prior
Article 467 (immovable by nature), actual attachment still exists, and the content
of prior Article 467 still remains in the first paragraph of Article 466.
One possible problem with the argument that prior Article 467 is still
embodied in the first paragraph of Article 466 is the use of the word "permanently
attached" in both paragraphs of Article 466." Prior Article 467 simply required
that the listed movables be "connected or attached."93 Current Article 466 uses the
words "permanently attached" in the first paragraph. Professor Symeonides has
expounded perhaps the best explanation for the use of "permanently attached" in
both paragraphs of 466. He asserts, "The word permanent in that [first] paragraph
is intended to have a temporal rather than a physical connotation, i.e., permanent
as opposed to temporary, not permanent as opposed to loose attachment." 4
This explanation is consistent with the plain meaning of the word "permanent."
It is defined as "lasting or meant to last indefinitely." If something is "lasting or
meant to last," it either cannot be removed or is not intended to be removed. This
definition shows that the word permanent has both a temporal meaning and a
physical meaning as Symeonides suggests, as opposed to just a physical
connotation as the Prytania court suggests.
Another indication that Article 466 is made up of two completely independent
types of component parts is contained in Civil Code article 468 concerning
deimmobilization of component parts." That article provides in pertinent part:
The owner may deimmobilize the component parts of an immovable by
an act translative of ownership and delivery to acquirers in good faith.
In the absence of rights of third persons, the owner may deimmobilize
things by detachment or removal."
The fact that the article provides two ways to deimmobilize suggests that there
might be two different types of attachment as opposed to the one type of attachment
that the Prytania court suggests. The court asserts that permanent attachment only
occurs when removal of the movable substantially damages either the immovable
or the component part itself." Moreover, the second paragraph of Article 466 itself
contemplates removal. It provides, "Things are considered permanently attached
if they cannot be removed without substantial damage."' Thus, it is obvious that
the second paragraph of Article 466 contemplates removal. The Prytania court
asserted that the only way for a movable to become a component part is to satisfy
this second paragraph. The problem, then, is that the holding of the Prytania court
92. See La. Civ. Code art. 466.
93. La. Civ. Code art. 467 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts No. 728).
94. See Symeonides, supra note 24, at 688.
95. Webster's i New Riverside University Dictionary (1994).
96. La. Civ. Code art. 468.
97. Id.
98. Prytania. 179 F. 3d at 179.
99. La. Civ. Code art. 466. 2nd para. (emphasis added).
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is inconsistent with Article 468 and its interpretation. Article 468 contemplates a
different kind of component part-one that can be deimmobilized by simple
detachment as opposed to removal. Removal suggests more of an effort than a
simple detachment. Article 468 seems more consistent with the interpretation of
Article 466 given by the legal scholars such as Yiannopoulos and Symeonides.
Removal would refer to the second paragraph of Article 466 (component parts as
a matter of fact), while detachment would refer to the first paragraph (component
parts as a matter of law).
B. Support for Professor Yiannopoulos' Position-The Rebuttal
1. Interpretation of Article 466
The Prytania court's main argument for a strict interpretation of Article 466
in deviation from past interpretations is that the interpretation offered by
Yiannopoulos was "launched... from the forehead of an expert" on the stand in
the Equibank case."W This statement is without merit. A rebuttal of this argument
and another indication that Article 466 is in fact composed of both prior Articles
467 and 469, rather than just old Article 469, is contained in Table 5 of the Civil
Code entitled, "Concordance for the 1976-1994 Revision."' °' This table shows the
origin of the current articles. When one looks up Article 466, it can be seen that
Article 466 is made up of old Articles 467, 468, and 469, and not just Article 469.
It might be argued that this derivation table only shows where the general subject
matter of the prior articles is now contained; however, this would be incorrect. In
the introduction to the table, the author wrote, "There is no concordance for
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code that are no longer in force.""l°e This
language means that if a particular code article from the Code of 1870 is no longer
in force in any respect, then it will not be included in the table. In addition, there
are some articles that are listed as being in existence in 1870 with no corresponding
article in the current code. This fact supports the argument that the table cannot
possibly be dealing with only general subject matter. If it were dealing with only
general subject matter, each article from the Code of 1870 would have some
corresponding article in the present code since general subject matter does not
normally disappear from a civil system. In this case, old Article 467 is included in
the table. As a result, it must be inferred that old Article 467 is still in existence in
some respect (more than just generally) within Article 466.
2. Societal Expectations Test
Regardless of whether the Prytania court was correct in interpreting Article
466 as creating one type of component part, the court attacked the societal
100. Prytania. 179 F. 3d at 180.
101. La. Civ. Code, Table 5, Concordance for the 1976. 1994 Revision (1998).
102. Id., Introduction.
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expectations test as to what belongs in the list in the first paragraph of Article
466.'03 As stated previously, "[Tihe societal expectations canon... was launched-
full grown from the forehead of an expert witness [Professor Yiannopoulos] who
testified for the IRS during the trial of that case."' 04 The court went on to claim,
"The pedigree of the Professor's 'societal expectations' canon is murky at best.""
The court was not only incorrect in its assertion that there is no support for
Yiannopoulos' testimony that Article 466 is actually composed of two different'
types of component parts, but also incorrect in thinking that the societal
expectations test simply jumped from the forehead of Professor Yiannopoulos
while on the stand in Equibank. In fact, Professor Yiannopoulos' societal
expectations test was mentioned in his Expose des Motifs (the introduction) to the
1978 revised version of the property articles in the Civil Code. He states that
"prevailing ideas in society" and "lay notions" are often useful in classifying things
as immovables.'1 The court disregards this statement as a "vague allusion.""°
However, this is no vague allusion. Professor Yiannopoulos was more likely than
not writing based on the assumption that Article 466 is composed of both Articles
467 and 469. Under this assumption, the Professor was using prior jurisprudential
interpretation of Article 467 and the methods of other civilian systems in coming
to the educated conclusion that the views of society should be used in determining
what will constitute a component part.
The key case in deciding the scope of prior Article 467 was Lafleur v. Foret.'°
In Lafleur, the court held that window air conditioning units did not fall within
Article 467 and thus remained movables. 1 In that case, the units were connected
to the building by screws attached to racks installed on the windowsills. Since
window units were not listed in prior Article 467, the court looked to the prevailing
views of society to determine whether the units were considered component parts.
The Lafleur case was decided in 1968, seventeen years before the Prytania court
stated that the societal expectations test "was launched-full grown from the
forehead" of Professor Yiannopoulos." 0 As can be seen, the societal expectations
test was expounded well before Yiannopoulos took the stand in Equibank.
Moreover, Yiannopoulos seems to have advocated the "societal expectations"
test in an attempt to show that Louisiana's developments, especially the early
amendment of old Article 467, were consistent with the developments in European
systems."' In his 1962 law review article entitled, "Movables & Immovables in
Louisiana and Comparative Law," the Professor cites that both the Greek and
103. See Prytania, 179 F. 3d at 182, nn.34-35.
104. Id. at 180.
105. Id. at 181, n.34.
106. La. Civ. Code Ann., Expose des Motifs (West 1980).
107. Prytania. 179 F.3d at 181. n.34.
108. 213 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
109. Id.
110. Prytaniao 179 F. 3d at 180.
111. See A. N. Yiannopoulos, Movables & Immovables in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 22
La. L Rev. 517 (1962).
[Vol. 60
NOTES
German civil codes create two separate and distinct types of component parts. "2
He wrote that historically within the Greek system, the line of demarcation between
the two types was drawn based on the prevailing views of society."I
This test based on the views of society was historically advocated in Louisiana
well before the decision in Lafleur. This was evidenced by the 1946 decision of
Kelieher v. Gravois."' That court stated:
Act No. 51 of 1912, which amended Article 467 ... no doubt evidences
an intention of the Legislature to extend and broaden the category of
things which... become immovables by nature... [t]he things listed in
the act of 1912 are merely illustrative and not restrictive. The Venetian
blinds are not so universally recognized ... as to justify the conclusion
that [they should be classified as immovables]."
The language of this decision supports Yiannopoulos' "societal expectations" test
which he asserted on the stand in Equibank. It shows that the theme running
throughout the amendments made to these articles has been to expand the types of
movables that become immovable based on .what is "universally recognized" as
things that should transfer with the immovable. Ejusdem generis should not be
used to determine what fits within the list. Instead, the view of society should be
used. Therefore, for the court to assert that the societal expectations test had no
basis in history was completely erroneous.
V. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
A. The Erie Doctrine
As discussed previously, the Prytania court was substantively incorrect in
holding that Article 466 is composed of only one type of component part. In
addition, the court did not have the procedural authority to decide the way that it
did. The problem arises when a federal court, such as the court in this case, must
decide whether to use federal or state law." 6 This problem was addressed in the
case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins." 7 The Erie doctrine held that a federal
court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply state law."' This doctrine was
refined in 1945 in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York." 9 That court held:
[W]here a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the
diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the
federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 26 So. 2d 304 (La. App. Od. 1946).
115. Id. at307-08.
116. Charles Allen Wright. Federal Courts (3d ed. 1976).
117. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64. 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
118. Id.
119. 326 U.S. 99.65 S.Ct. 1464(1945).
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determine the outcome of litigation, as it would be if tried in a State
court.120
The Fifth Circuit itself addressed the Erie doctrine in Lamarque v. Massachusetts
Indemnity and Life Insurance Co. 12 The court, citing Brumley Estate v. Iowa Beef
Processors,*" asserted, "Federal courts sitting in diversity in this Circuit are
obliged to apply the latest and most authoritative expression of state law applicable
to the facts of a case."'2.
Through the years the words have changed some, but the Erie doctrine has
remained, in substance, the same. "A federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction
and called upon in that role to apply state law is absolutely bound by a current
interpretation of that law formulated by the state's highest tribunal."'" The highest
tribunal in Louisiana is the Louisiana Supreme Court. The supreme court has not
ruled on the interpretation of Article 466. Therefore, the appropriate question is
what a federal court should do when the highest tribunal has not ruled.
This issue was addressed in F.D.I. C. v. Abraham.'1 That court, interestingly
led by Judge Wiener, held as follows:
[W]hen a state's highest court has not spoken on an issue, our task is to
determine as best we can how that court would rule if the issue were
before it. In so doing, we are bound by an intermediate state appellate
court decision only when we "remain unconvinced 'by other.., data that
the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.""126
Basically, the court is bound by state appellate court decisions unless the supreme
court would decide otherwise. It is highly doubtful that the supreme court would
decide differently than previous courts' interpretations of Article 466, since every
circuit in Louisiana has taken the interpretation given Article 466 by Professor
Yiannopoulos. It is highly unlikely that the Louisiana Supreme Court would stray
from these decisions. Therefore, the Prytania court, headed by Wiener, should
have been bound to the state appellate courts according to the language that Wiener
himself posited in Abraham.
Why did the court in Prytania disregard the previous decisions of the state
appellate courts? As previously discussed, Louisiana state appellate courts have
unanimously adopted the Equibank interpretation of Article 466.127 The only
possible-explanation is that the court in Prytania simply disregarded a procedural
120. Id.
121. 794 F.2d 194 (Sth Cir. 1986).
122. 704 F.2d 1351, 1360(SthCir. 1983).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Daigle v. Maine Medical Cr.. Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 689 ( st Cir. 1994).
125. 137 P.3d 264 (5th Cir. 1998).
126. Id. at 268 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).
127. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Shel-Boze, Inc., 527 So. 2d 1052 (La. App. IstCir. 1988);
Hyman v. Ross, 643 So. 2d 256, (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994); Lakeside Nat'l Bank of Lake Charles v.
Moreaux, 576 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); In re Chase Manhattan Leasing Corp., 626 So. 2d
433 (La. App. 4th Cit. 1993).
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rule that it was required by the Supreme Court of the United States to follow. As
a result, the court did not have the authority to give Article 466 a new
interpretation.
B. Panel Decisions
Not only did the court in Prytania not have the authority to disregard
Louisiana state court interpretations of Civil Code article 466, but it also lacked the
procedural authority to disregard prior Fifth Circuit decisions interpreting that
article. As stated previously in the case of Moll v. Brown and Root, Inc., "The
Fifth Circuit is 'a strict stare decisis court' ... [the] court is bound by the Fifth
Circuit's interpretations of Article 466 absent an intervening change in state
law."' 2'
The Fifth Circuit itself expounded this point in 1995 in Floors Unlimited, Inc.
v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc. 1" That court held:
[U]nder the stare decisis rule of this circuit, which provides that one panel
cannot overturn the decision of a prior panel in the absence of en banc
reconsideration or a superseding Supreme Court decision.... [However,
as a corollary of this rule] [I]n diversity cases we must follow subsequent
state court decisions that are clearly contrary to one of our prior
decisions.' 30
In short, the Fifth Circuit must follow the prior panel decisions of the circuit
unless a state court has re-examined the issue in question and decided to the
contrary of prior Fifth Circuit decisions. The state courts have not reversed their
earlier interpretations of Article 466. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit in Prytania,
according to the stare decisis rule set forth in both Floors Unlimited and Moll, did
not have the authority to decide the case the way that it did.
This conclusion begs the question why Judge Wiener and the court in Prytania
decided to abandon the interpretation given Article 466 by the Equibank court.
Interestingly, Judge Wiener led a decision just three months after the Prytania
decision which outlined this rule quite well. That court held:
One panel of the Court of Appeals cannot disregard, much less overrule,
the decision of a prior panel, even on decisions involving interpretation
of state law. Only supervening contrary decisions of the state's highest
court or the supervening enactment of a controlling statute will render
[Court of Appeals] decisions clearly wrong and thus no longer
precedential. 3 1
128. Moll v. Brown & Root. Inc.. No. Civ. A. 97-2671,1999 WL 155948 (E.D. La. Jan. 22,1999).
129. 55F.3d 181 (5th Cir. 1995).
130. Id. at 185.
131. Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354. 360 n.15 (5th Cir. 1999).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The court's decision in Prytania is troubling. Although, component parts of
immovables are a small part of the law, the court's dicta can create many
problems. I" The main problem with the holding is ascertaining what interpretation
is controlling. The impact of multiple interpretations may seem minuscule.
However, to an unsuspecting, deeply indebted buyer, having to purchase a water
heater or light fixtures in addition to the home itself may be a burden too heavy to
carry.
The court was substantively and procedurally erroneous in its decision.
Interpreting Article 466 in a way that produces only one type of component part
when removal would cause damage to either the movable or the immovable
produces absurd consequences. Movables listed in the first paragraph as
component parts would not pass, in some circumstances, the test the court says is
the only way for a movable to become a component part. In addition, history
dictates that the first paragraph of Article 466 is derived from prior Article 467
creating component parts by nature or as a matter of law. Moreover, the Civil Code
itself contains several statutory indications that there are two types of component
parts rather than just one as the court suggests.
Also, the court lacked the procedural authority to deviate from prior
interpretations of Article 466. According to the Erie doctrine, the court was
supposed to apply the interpretation Article 466 received from Louisiana's highest
tribunal. In this case, the court should have followed the Louisiana appellate courts
and applied the interpretation from Equibank. In addition, the court in this case did
not have the authority to break from prior Fifth Circuit panel decisions interpreting
the article. The question then becomes, what should be done to fix the problem?
One suggestion was expounded by Symeon Symeonides. He argues that it
would simply take a rewriting of the second paragraph of Article 466.' 33 The
second paragraph as it is written now provides, "Things are considered
permanently attached if they cannot be removed without substantial damage to
themselves or to the immovable to which they are attached:"' 4 Symeonides
suggests that this paragraph be rewritten to read, "Things permanently attached to
a building or other construction so that they cannot be removed without substantial
damage to themselves or to the thing to which they are attached, are likewise its
component parts.""'3 He argues that this change will show what constitutes
permanent attachment with respect to things other than those covered by the first
paragraph.136
132. Although the interpretation that the court gave Article 466 was stricty dictum, it still needs
to be addressed in this paper. The court gives extensive attention to the interpretation of Article 466.
On first wading, it can be quite difficult to see that the court's language was strictly dictum. It would
be easy for a lower court to adopt this interpretation thinking it is the law.
133. See Symeonides, supra note 24, at 689.
134. La. Civ. Code art. 466,2nd para.
135. See Symeonides, supra note 24, at 689.
136. Id.
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This suggestion is a good one and would ensure that all courts would interpret
the article the way that it should be interpreted. However, is this really necessary?
This type of a change would not be necessary if courts would simply follow the
procedural rules that currently exist. Before Prytania was decided, Article 466 was
being interpreted in the proper manner. The Prytania court, following the Erie
doctrine and the panel decisions of prior Fifth Circuit decisions, was required to
continue interpreting Article 466 in the same manner. However, because the court
found it necessary to re-interpret the article, safeguards such as the one suggested
by Symeonides are indeed necessary.
Taylor S. Carroll

